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CASE NOTES
ment freedoms the courts should strive to maintain the balance between
individual rights and the rights of society. The thought which remains is
whether a literal adherence to the dictates of Elfbrandt will tip the scale
too heavily in favor of the individual at the expense of the public.
Hugo Scala
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MERE EVIDENCE RULE
AS A CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
Defendant, a California physician, treated a number of patients whose
medical care was paid for by the Bureau of Public Assistance of Los
Angeles County. In order to receive compensation for such services, the
physician was required to submit medical care statements certifying that
he had performed the services described and that the amount due for such
services had not been paid. Defendant had been submitting fraudulent
statements to the Bureau and was convicted in the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, for violating Sec. 72 of the Penal Code of California.' At
the trial, the state introduced certain of the doctor's medical files which
proved that many of the services billed to the Bureau had never been
rendered. These files had been seized under a valid search warrant. De-
fendant appealed, contending that the seizure of the records and their use
in evidence was a denial of the constitutional protection of the fourth,2
fifth,3 and fourteenth amendments 4 of the Constitution of the United
States. This contention was based upon the theory that the so-called
"mere evidence" rule enunciated by the United States Supreme Court, un-
der which objects of merely evidentiary value may not be seized in any
manner, 5 is binding upon the states under the decision in Mapp v. Ohio.6
I CAL. PEN. CODE § 72 (West 1927).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
3 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself. .. "
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; ...
5 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298 (1921).
6 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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The Supreme Court of California affirmed the conviction holding that the
"mere evidence" rule is not a constitutional standard, that it does not
apply in California and that such seizures of mere evidence are properly
authorized by statute. People v. Thayer, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780, 408 P.2d 108
(1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 908 (1966).
The issue thus raised is whether the fourth amendment, applicable to the
states through the fourteenth, prohibits the seizure of objects of merely
evidentiary value without regard to the manner in which they are seized.
The purpose of this note is to indicate the state trend towards denying the
existence of such a prohibition in the fourth amendment, thus rejecting the
applicability of the "mere evidence" rule to the states.
Boyd v. United States7 is generally considered to be the case in which
the "mere evidence" rule had its origin.8 The court held that searching for
and seizing a man's private papers merely to obtain evidence against him
is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment and their use as evidence is a violation of the fifth amendment.
Later, in Gouled v. United States,9 a clear, yet very general, rule was
developed. The Court, at least partially relying on the Boyd decision,
widened the scope of applicability of the rule to include objects other than
private papers.' 0 In justifying the application of the rule the Court held
that the government's right to seize property must be based on an impor-
tant and legitimate interest of the public in the property, in the right to its
possession or on a valid exercise of police power which has rendered its
possession unlawful." The terms used to describe the classes of property
which were indicated in the Gouled case' 2 as those which could lawfully
be seized under this principle are: (1) fruits of a crime, (2) instruments
used in the commission of a crime (instrumentalities), (3) contraband and
7 Supra note 5.
s See Gouled v. United States, supra note 5; State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 213 A.2d
185 (1965); Limitation on Seizures of 'Evidentiary' Objects: A Rule in Search of a
Reason, 20 U. CH. L. REV. 319 (1953); Evidentiary Searches: The Rule and the
Reason, 54 GEO. L.J. 593 (1966).
9 Supra note 5.
10 Boyd v. United States, supra note 5, was basically concerned with the seizure of
private papers while Gouled v. United States extended the rule by saying that private
papers had no special sanctity from seizure and that the kind of property taken was
not important. The only important question was held to be whether or not the gov-
ernment had an overriding property right in the objects, based on a property rights
theory therein discussed.
11 For discussion of the property rights thesis, see generally Gouled v. United States,
supra note 5; Limitation of Seizures of 'Evidentiary' Objects: A Rule in Search of a
Reason, supra note 8; Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the
Fourth Amendment, 23 U. CHi. L. REV. 664 (1961); Evidentiary Searches: The Rule
and The Reason, supra note 8.
12Supra note 5, at 308.
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(4) weapons and other means of escape. 13 Under the Gouled decision any
item of property which does not fit into one of the above-mentioned
categories is merely of evidentiary value and accordingly, a search for or
seizure of any such item is prohibited by the fourth amendment and the
introduction in evidence thereof is prohibited by the fifth amendment to
the federal constitution, i.e. the seizure of merely evidentiary material is in
itself unreasonable without regard to the manner in which it is seized. 14
All of the Supreme Court and lower federal court cases since Gouled
have purported to use the "mere evidence" rule in reaching their decisions.
However, due to an inconsistent classification by the courts of articles as
"mere evidence" which may not be seized, or as instrumentalities which
may be seized, these decisions appear to be irreconcilable.' 5 It appears that
in cases involving the seizure of similar property in connection with
similar crimes the courts have reached opposite conclusions, some cases
holding tht objects seized to be "mere evidence," and other cases holding
them to be "instrumentalities."'u Regardless of this apparent inconsistency,
however, all of these decisions do fall into a pattern. In all cases in which
the search has been held to have been reasonable with regard to its scope,
manner and the authority under which it was made, the courts have found
the items seized to be instruments of the crime. In those cases where the
search has been found to have been unreasonable because it was general
and exploratory, the courts have found the items seized to have been
"mere evidence." Thus, the federal cases, although purporting to be based
13For cases involving classes (1), (3), and (4), see Boyd v. United States, supra
note 5, which discusses seizure of stolen goods; Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145(1947), which involved seizure of contraband. See generally 82 A.L.R. 782; Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows
on the Fourth Amendment, supra note 11.
14See Gouled v. United States, supra note 5; Go-Bart Importing Company v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932);
Kirvin v. United States, 5 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1924); United States v. Snow, 9 F.2d 978(D.C. Mass. 1925); United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1930); Foley v.
United States, 64 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 762 (1933); United States
v. Thomson, 113 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1940); Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449(D.C. Cir. 1958). Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 234, exemplifies the above cases
as far as the statement that "not every item may be seized which is properly inspect-
able by the Government in the course of a legal search; for example, private papers
desired by the government merely for use as evidence may not be seized, no matter
how lawful the search which discovers them ......
15 Abel v. United States, supra note 14, at 235; the court stated that "the several
cases on this subject in this court cannot be satisfactorily reconciled."
16 Compare Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) and Foley v. United
States, supra note 14, which both involved the seizure of books and records involved
in illegal liquor establishments with United States v. Lefkowitz, supra note 14, which
also involved the seizure of books and papers involved in an illegal liquor establish-
ment.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
on the mere evidence rule, can be distinguished on the basis of the reason-
ableness of the search alone. 17 Three federal courts have gone so far as to
say that: "The line between fruit of the crime itself and mere evidence
thereof may be narrow, and perhaps turn more on the good faith of the
search than the actual distinction between fruits and evidence,"' 8 thus pro-
posing the theory that the good faith and reasonableness of the search is
the test used by the federal courts to determine which objects are fruits
and instruments of crime and therefore subject to seizure, and which are
"mere evidence" and therefore not subject to seizure. 19 Nevertheless, the
rule still exists and the decision of Mapp v. Ohio,20 has created the question
of its applicability to the states as a constitutional principle.
In Mapp v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court held the fourth
amendment to the federal constitution was applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. Thus, it would appear that if the "mere evi-
dence" rule is a constitutional standard, derived from the fourth amend-
ment, it is mandatory on the states under the Mapp decision. A recent
federal case in Maryland considering this question has held that the rule is
of such constitutional proportions that Mapp v. Ohio has forced it upon
the state courts. In Hayden v. Warden,21 the court held that: "The pro-
scription against seizure of articles of only evidentiary value is one of
constitutional dimensions. '22 The court declared that although
judges, aware of the practical problems faced by police officers and prose-
cutors in the performance of their duties, have sometimes strained mightily
to overcome the exclusionary effect of the 'mere evidence' rule by stretching
to the point of distortion the category of 'instrumentalities of crime' [citing
Guido23 as an example]. . . . [T]he rationale of the mere evidence rule has
been the subject of vigorous debate .... [I]t may be thought timely to expose
the doctrine to reexamination and reinterpretation .... [U]nless the Supreme
Court sees fit to depart from its oft reiterated position, the judges of sub-
ordinate courts are obliged to adhere to it.24
17 Compare Marron v. United States, supra note 16; Furlong v. United States, 10
F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1926); United States v. Poller, supra note 14; Foley v. United
States, supra note 14; Landau v. United States, 82 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied,
298 U.S. 556 (1936); United States v. Brengle, 29 F. Supp. 190 (D.C.W.D. Va. 1939);
Mathews v. Correa, 135 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1943) with United States v. Lefkowitz, supra
note 14; Kirvin v. United States, supra note 14; Bushouse v. United States, 67 F.2d
843 (6th Cir. 1933); United States v. Thomson, supra note 14; United States v. Lerner,
100 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal., S.D. 1951); Morrison v. United States, supra note 14.
18 United States v. Guido, 251 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 950
(1958).
19 See Mathews v. Correa, supra note 17; Harris v. United States, 151 F.2d 837, 840
(10th Cir. 1945); United States v. Guido, supra note 18.
20 Supra note 6.
21 363 F.2d 647 (4th Cir. 1966). 28 United States v. Guido, supra note 18.
22 Id. at 651. 24 Supra note 21, at 655.
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However, a number of other states recently considering the question
have, unlike the Maryland case, denied the rule as a constitutional standard
and have refused to apply it. These jurisdictions have replaced the rule
with one based only on the reasonableness of the search itself and do not
consider a search to bbe unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth
amendment only because "mere evidence" is seized. Typical of the lan-
guage of the decisions:
It is far more palatable to say directly that title and possession are beyond
the point: that the fourth amendment, striking a balance between the right
of the individual suspected of crime and the duty of the state to protect its
citizens, permits a search for the avowed purpose of finding evidence with
which to convict so long at least as there is not involved the evil of the
general warrant, the unrestricted invasion of the privacy of a man's papers
with which Boyd . . . was concerned.
The fourth amendment contemplates that things may be seized for their in-
culpatory value alone and that a search to that end is valid as long as it is not
otherwise unreasonable and the fourth amendment formal requirements are
met.
25
All state decisions which have denied the constitutional proportion of
the mere evidence rule are in agreement with the above statements. In
State v. Raymond,26 the court indicated that it could consider the clothing
as an instrumentality of the crime, holding that "such efforts to stay within
the rule have correctly been termed frivolous. ."... ,,27The court went on
to say that the fourth amendment does not prohibit the seizure of "mere
evidence" and cites State v. Bisaccia,28 a New Jersey case which was in
complete agreement on this point. In the Bisaccia case, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that a search for evidence with which to convict the
accused is permitted by the fourth amendment as long as the search does
not involve the evils of the general warrant or the unrestricted invasion of
a man's privacy or his private papers. The court indicated that a search for
and seizure of private papers is likely to be exploratory in view of the
nature of private papers but not because they are "mere evidence" in any
one particular situation. The rule which results from the Bisaccia decision
tests the reasonableness of the search rather than the "instrumentality" or
"mere evidence" characteristics of the objects seized.
Some states have statutes which, as construed, authorize the seizure of
"mere evidence." 29 California is one such state and the Supreme Court of
2 5 State v. Raymond, 142 N.W.2d 444, 451 (Iowa 1966). 2 61d.
27 Id. at 450. See also State v. Bisaccia, supra note 8, at 517, 213 A.2d at 195.
28 Supra note 8.
29 Included are California, New York, New Jersey, New Hampshire, and Oregon.
Some states have statutory provisions which are very similar to the provisions of the
states just mentioned. However, these provisions do not appear to have been inter-
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California in the instant case"° held such a statute81 constitutional. New
York also has such a statute.82 In People v. Carrolls3 the New York Court
said;
It was clearly within the competence of the legislature, under the state's
police power, to extend the right of search and seizure to property constituting
evidence of crime or tending to show that a particular person committed a
crime.
What the constitution only forbids is an unreasonable search and seizure. It
does not delineate the types of property subject to seizure-whether it be the
fruits of crime, the instrumentalities, matter of contraband, or the evidence
as to its commission."'
The application of the New York statute can better be seen in People v.
Martin"5 in which a search warrant was issued for the seizure of an
preted as yet. Illinois has such a statute, ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch 38, S 108-1 (1963) which
reads as follows: "When a lawful arrest is effected, a police officer may reasonably
search the person arrested and they are within such person's immediate presence for
the purpose of:
(a) Protecting the officer from attack; or
(b) Preventing the person from escaping; or
(c) Discovering the fruits of the crime; or
(d) Discovering any instruments, articles or things which may have been used
in the commission of, or which may constitute evidence of, an offense."
(Emphasis added. Subsection (d) was not originally included in the drafting
of the present statute, but the reason for its later addition is not yet clear.)
Minnesota has a provision which would certainly indicate that the seizure of mere
evidence is authorized. MIN. STAT. ANN. § 626.07 (1963) provides: "A search warrant
may be issued upon any of the following grounds: (5) The property or things to be
seized consist of any item or constitute any evidence which tends to show a crime
has been committed, or tends to show that a particular person has committed a crime."
Vermont has a search warrant statute, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 4701 (1958), which
authorizes the issuance of a search warrant, "(9) to search for and seize implements,
devices, tools, materials, or any other personal property alleged to have been used in
the commission of, or which may constitute evidence of, a crime." Other subsections
of this statute allow seizure of specific items which "may tend to convict a person
of a criminal offense .... "
3o People v. Thayer, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780, 408 P.2d 108 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 908
(1966).
31 CAL. PEN. CODE. § 1524, subd. 4 (West 1957) provides: "It may be issued upon
any of the following grounds: [4] When the property or things to be seized consist
of any items or constitutes any evidence which tends to show a felony has been
committed or tends to show that a particular person has committed a felony."
82 N.Y. CRIM. CODE PROC. § 792 (4) (1962), allows the seizure of "property consti-
tuting evidence of crime or tending to show that a particular person committed a
crime."
38 238 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1963).
84 Id. at 642, 643.
35 267 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1966).
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appointment pad and other papers of the defendant doctor upon which a
woman's name appeared, the woman being involved in an abortion. The
officers, however, seized two filing cabinets. The court held that:
The Federal standard and most state search warrant statutes limit the warrant
to fruits of a crime, contraband and instrumentalities used in the commission
of a crime. In 1962 the New York statute . . . was amended to add ... [P]rop-
erty constituting evidence of a crime .... 36
The court holds that subdivision 4 as such does not offend any constitutional
standard and is a valid statutory enactment, adopted and existent in a number
of states. But its use here to authorize a general and exploratory search of an
individual's private papers to search for possible evidence of crime .. .is con-
stitutionally impermissible .... 8T
The Bisaccia caseas had previously construed a New Jersey court rule39 as
rejecting the applicability of the "mere evidence" rule to the states and
both People v. Thayer and the Bisaccia case are discussed in Martin as
authority for this New York holding.
In Oregon, where similar legislation has been enacted, 41 an Oregon
court held that property which would constitute evidence of the crime
could now be seized. 42 There, the court felt it was not necessary to pass
on the applicability of the "mere evidence" rule to the states.
New Hampshire has a statute which allows seizure of "the subject mat-
ter of any offense not herein specifically mentioned. '43 The Supreme
Court of New Hampshire in State v. Coolidge,44 held that this statutory
provision is not contrary to the fourth amendment. According to the
court "the test is always whether the search and seizure under the facts
and circumstances of the case was reasonable." 45 The court pointed out
that neither the arrest nor the search warrants involved were a pretext for
making "a general exploratory search with the sole aim of finding evidence
to connect the defendant with some crime."'46 The court thus found all
86 Id. at 406.
37 Id. at 407.
88 State v. Bisaccia, supra note 8.
89 N.J. RuL.s 3:2A-2, reads: "A search warrant may be issued to search and seize
any property: [c] Constituting evidence of or tending to show any such violation."
40 Supra note 30.
41 ORE. REV. STAT. ch. 141, § 141.010 (1963) reads as follows: "A search warrant
may be issued on the following grounds: [2] When the property was used in the
commission of, or which would constitute evidence of, the crime."
42 State v. Cook, 411 P.2d 78, 82 (Ore. 1966).
43 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 595:1, VI (1955).
44 106 N.H. 186, 208 A.2d 322 (1965).
451d. at -- , 208 A.2d at 333. 46 Ibid.
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articles taken were the fruit of a proper search and seizure and were thus
admissible.
It is apparent that some federal and state courts have refused to give
effect to the "mere evidence" rule47 and some state courts have gone so far
as to reject it outright.48 In so doing, most of the state decisions mentioned
above discuss the constitutionality of their own statutes and decisions but
do not expressly criticize the "mere evidence" rule itself. People v.
Thayer,49 on the other hand, criticizes the rule in detail. The court notes
that "the asserted rule that mere evidence cannot be seized under a war-
rant or otherwise is condemned as unsound by virtually all modern
writers."50 The court then points out that:
the rationale for this curious doctrine has never been satisfactorily articulated.
A person has a constitutional right to be secure from unreasonable searches
by the police. When the search itself is reasonable, however, it is impossible
to understand why the admissibility of seized items should depend on whether
they are merely evidentiary or evidentiary plus something else. 5'
The reasons for the "mere evidence" rule are not clearly linked to the
fourth amendment. It is obvious that there is no language in the fourth
amendment which can be used as a basis for this rule and no case has ever
attempted to use the language of the amendment for this purpose.
The Boyd case52 seemed to be primarily concerned with the imple-
mentation of the purpose of the fourth amendment, the prevention of
general exploratory searches. However, the "mere evidence" rule does not
prevent a particular kind of search. Indeed, the rule is directed only to the
objects seized in the search. Under the rule, if the objects seized are not
instrumentalities, fruits of a crime, means of escape or contraband, they
cannot be seized. This is true without regard to the manner, scope or
authority of the search. 53 Thus, the rule does not bear any relation to the
purpose of the fourth amendment.
47 See Marron v. United States, supra note 16; Foley v. United States, supra note
14; Mathews v. Correa, supra note 17.
48 See People v. Thayer, supra note 30; State v. Bisaccia, supra note 8; People v.
Carroll, supra note 33.
49 Supra note 30.
50 Supra note 30, at 731, 408 P.2d at 109. The mere evidence rule has been criticized
in MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT, 182 (1959); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 5 2134(a) and
2264 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Corwin, The Supreme Courts Construction of the
Self-Incrimination Cause, 29 MICH. L. Rev. 1, 16, and 205 (1930); Search and Seizure
in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, supra note 11; Limitation
of Seizures of 'Evidentiary' Objects: A Rule in Search of a Reason, supra note 8;
Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CALIF. L. REV.
474 (1961); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuE LJ. 319
(1962).
51 Supra note 30, at 731, 408 P.2d at 109.
52 Boyd v. United States, supra note 5. 53 Supra note 14.
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Boyd mentioned and Gouled relied upon a property rights theory as a
basis for the rule.54 However, the property rights theory does not fully
explain the rule. Gouled upheld the government's right to seize an instru-
ment of a crime based on the overriding property right in the government
for the public welfare to prevent further use of certain property in per-
petration of a crime. The prevention of the further use of an object in
crime does not seem to be an appropriate reason for the seizure of a shoe55
or a typewriter56 (which have been held to be instrumentalities) and fails
completely to explain the seizure of items such as water and gas bills (also
held to be instruments of crime).57 Obviously, a water bill is beyond
usefulness in committing a crime even if it is not seized.58
Even assuming that the property rights theory sufficiently explains the
so-called instrumentality exception, there appears to be no justification
for the use of the property as evidence because the seizure of such proper-
ty, alone, succeeds in preventing its use in furtherance of crime. It might
be explained that the use of the property as evidence might also prevent
further crime by sending its owner to prison. However, this does not
justify the admission in evidence of instrumentalities since "sending the
owner to prison may prevent further crimes, but this consideration applies
to mere evidence as well as instrumentalities." 59
If the Supreme Court of the United States finds that the "mere evi-
dence" rule is a constitutional standard, the rule being applied by the courts
of the several above mentioned states must be unconstitutional. However,
as previously noted, there appears to be no basis in the fourth amendment
itself for such a conclusion. Any interpretation by a court should be
founded on the express language, background, and purpose of the fourth
amendment. The "mere evidence" rule does not appear to be so founded.
Since the "mere evidence" rule was conceived, there has been much criti-
cism of it and great confusion concerning it. "The rule has been dis-
tinguished nearly out of existence by the application of the instrumentality
exception."'60 It appears that federal courts may be tending towards avoid-
ance of the rule by application of this exception. As noted earlier, the
54 Supra note 5. 55 United States v. Guido, supra note 18.
56 Foley v. United States, supra note 14.
57 Marron v. United States, supra note 16.
58 Marron v. United States, supra note 16, at 199, defined an instrumentality as any-
thing "used to carry on the criminal enterprise." Within this definition would fall
many items which would be of no further value after their initial use. For example, a
spent bullet casing and the bullet once used to commit a crime cannot be used again
but certainly can be seized as instruments of murder. It thus appears that some items
may be seized without regard to the property right theory expressed by Gouled and
considered necessary under that explanation of the "mere evidence" rule and the so
called instrumentality exception.
59 Supra note 30, at 783, 408 P.2d at 111. 60 Ibid.
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result reached by the application of the instrumentality exception seems to
be the same as the result in the recent state decisions which have rejected
the rule flatly.61 These recent state decisions indicate a trend among the
states to reject the proposition that the "mere evidence" rule is mandatory
on the states under Mapp v. Ohio, i.e. that it is a constitutional standard.
The states hold instead that the purpose of the fourth amendment was to
prevent general exploratory searches and these are prohibited and nothing
more.
Many state courts do not appear to have considered the issue. It will be
interesting to observe the result when they do. However, the ultimate
answer must come from the Supreme Court of the United States. Since
state courts are expressly disregarding the rule and the federal courts are
reaching a similar result through the application of the instrumentality ex-
ception, it appears that the answer may soon be forthcoming. This answer
may have already been indicated by the failure of the Supreme Court of
the United States to review not only the federal court decisions which
have tended towards dilution of the rule, 62 but also the state court decisions
which have clearly rejected the rule.63
Stuart Weisler
61 See People v. Carroll, supra note 33; People v. Grossman, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266
(1965); People v. Martin, supra note 35; People v. Thayer, supra note 30; People v.
Potter, 49 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1966); State v. Bisaccia, supra note 8; State v. Wade, 46
N.J. 48, 214 A.2d 411 (1965); State v. Fioravanti, 46 N.H. 109, 215 A.2d 16 (1965);
State v. Coolidge, supra note 44; State v. Cook, supra note 42.
62 Foley v. United States, supra note 14; Landau v. United States, supra note 14;
United States v. Guido, supra note 18; United States v. Boyette, 299 F.2d 92 (4th Cir.
1962).
63 Supra note 30.
CONTRACTS-REAL ESTATE BROKER-RIGHT TO
COMMISSION UPON VENDOR'S ARBITRARY
REFUSAL TO ENTER CONTRACT OF SALE
Stromer, a real estate broker, entered into an oral contract' with de-
l The fact and terms of employment were found in a counteroffer to the vendee
sent through the broker. In addition, when Browning's documents were delivered
to the escrow depositary, a brokerage contract signed by Browning was included. Cali-
fornia courts have held that signed escrow instructions, when of sufficient content,
satisfy the Statute of Frauds, Beazell v. Schrader, 59 Cal.2d 577, 381 P.2d 390 (1963).
Sufficient content means written evidence of an actual employment relationship.
Franklin v. Hansen, 59 Cal.2d 570, 381 P.2d 386 (1963). In addition to California there
are sixteen states which require brokerage contracts to be in writing before a broker
can recover his commission: Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan,
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wis-
consin, and New Mexico.
